This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Tonkin Gulf The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. That very night, the idea was put to the test. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Hickman, Kennedy. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." . He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. 1, p. 646. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. 2. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. . Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives 313-314. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. $22. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. . Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 . Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol.